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Analyzing Seizures Under the Louisiana Constitution After
State v. Tucker:' A Different Perspective
I. INTRODUCTION
The Louisiana Constitution, specifically the Declaration of Rights, lays down
the foundation for the operating rules of this state government and dictates how
that government conducts its fundamental relationships with citizens within the
state. While most students and practitioners of the law would consider participa-
tion in the development of constitutional law to be a milestone in a successful
career, Clarence Tucker may have a different view.
Tucker's involvement in the development of Louisiana constitutional law
stems from the second of his two arrests within a three-day span during February
and March of 1990. The first arrest occurred on February 28 and involved
charges of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon2 and possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute.3 The second arrest occurred the night of
March 2, during a drug sweep of the area surrounding Roby's Arcade in
Shreveport by both the Shreveport and Louisiana State Police. After a dozen
police cars had converged on the area, an officer stepped from his car and
ordered Tucker to "halt" and "prone out." 4 Before complying with the police
order, Tucker took a few steps away from the officer and threw aside a plastic
bag. Upon retrieving the bag, the officer discovered marijuana in it and arrested
Tucker for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.'
Tucker was convicted on both possession counts, from which he appealed.
The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction on the
first count of possession with intent to distribute, but reversed the second count.6
The appellate court found that the officer's commands would cause a reasonable
person to believe that a detention was imminent,7 and that under the circum-
stances those commands invaded Clarence Tucker's "right to be left alone." 8
The appellate court found the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
Tucker;9 therefore, the detention of his person was a violation of Article I,
section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution."0 The court held the marijuana should
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REViEW.
1. 626 So. 2d 707 (La.), affd on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
2. La. R.S. 14:95.1 (1986).
3. La. R.S. 40:966 (1992).
4. State v. Tucker, 604 So. 2d 600, 606-7 (La. App. 2d Cir.), qJ]'d in part. rev'd in part, 626
So. 2d 707, afl'd on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
5. La. R.S. 40:966 (1992).
6. Tucker, 604 So. 2d at 613.
7. hI. at 608.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 609.
10. See infra text accompanying note 21.
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have been excluded at trial, relying, though not explicitly, on the exclusionary
rule."
Both the State and Tucker applied for writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The supreme court upholds the appellate court decision affirming the conviction
for the first count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, but
reverses the appellate court and reinstates the conviction on the second count.'2
The ruling on the second conviction is affirmed on rehearing.' 3 The Louisiana
Supreme Court observes the factual circumstances of the encounter, relies on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. Hodari D.,' 4 and
creates a new test for defining seizure under the Louisiana Constitution.
Although the majority's application of the new seizure test to the Tucker
encounter is questionable,'" Tucker's individual situation is not the focus of this
note. Even if upon rehearing the Louisiana Supreme Court had reversed itself
on the second conviction, Tucker would not be in a better situation: the
conviction for the first count of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
was upheld on appeal.' 6 Rather, the purposes of this note are to analyze how
the new test narrows the categories of constitutionally protected interactions
between the state government and its citizens, and to propose a remedy for the
narrowing effect. Part II will examine the right involved in seizure situations,
the type of government/citizen interactions that impact that right, and the use of
the exclusionary rule to protect the citizen's rights. Part III includes an
examination of the prior test for seizure, a discussion of the elements of the new
test, a clarification of the differences between the two tests, and a proposed
remedy for the narrowing effect on constitutionally protected rights by the new
test.
11. State v. Tucker, 604 So. 2d 600, 609 (La. App. 2d Cir.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 626
So. 2d 707, affd on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993). Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684
(1961), made the exclusionary rule used in the federal jurisprudence applicable to state courts in cases
involving violations by the police of a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. By denying the state the
benefit of any evidence obtained through unconstitutional actions, the courts seek to deter such
actions. Louisiana also employs the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law. See La. Code Crim.
P. art. 703, which states in Part A: "A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any
evidence from use at the trial on the merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained."
12. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707 (La.), affd on reh'g. 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
13. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 720 (La. 1993).
14. 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
15. In his dissent, Chief Justice Calogero reviews the facts in light of the factors suggested by
the majority to be used in determining the "virtual certainty" of the occurrence of an actual stop. He
then criticizes the majority's application of the new test and its conclusion that Tucker had not been
seized: "It is hard to imagine a situation in which the seizure of a suspect could be any closer to
virtually certain." Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 716 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
16. Tucker received a twenty-five year sentence for the first conviction because he was adjudged
to be a third-felony offender. State v. Tucker. 604 So. 2d 600. 611-13 (La. App. 2d Cir.), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 626 So. 2d 707, affd on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993). The sentence for the
second conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute will be concurrent with the
first sentence. Tucker. 626 So. 2d at 709, 714.
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II. WHAT RIGHT IS AT STAKE?
The first step in the analysis of seizures under the Louisiana Constitution is
the identification of the right to be protected. The Louisiana Constitution
provides more protections for the rights of its citizens than the United States
Constitution. 7  Justice Dennis eloquently stated this premise in State v.
Hernandez:'8 "This constitutional declaration of right is not a duplicate of the
Fourth Amendment or merely coextensive with it; it is one of the most
conspicuous instances in which our citizens have chosen a higher standard of
individual liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the federal
constitution." 9 A textual comparison of the Fourth Amendment 0 and Article
I, section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution illustrates the greater protection
afforded by state law. While debate still exists on which specific liberties the
Fourth Amendment protects, the state constitution is more explicit. Article 1,
section 5 is captioned "Right to Privacy," and reads:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or
invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful
purpose or reason for the search. Any person adversely affected by a
search or seizure conducted in violation of this Section shall have
standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.2"
When compared with the Fourth Amendment, Article I, section 5 protects
additional subjects ("communications" and "property"), covers additional
government actions ("invasions of privacy"), and broadens the class of persons
with standing to assert a violation of this right ("any person adversely affect-
ed"). 22 The seizure of Tucker's person without probable cause or reasonable
17. See Richard P. Bullock, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974:
The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 La. L. Rev. 787, 788 (1991). Bullock quotes
from the Louisiana Supreme Court opinion in Guidry v. Roberts. 335 So. 2d 438, 448 (La. 1976),
to illustrate the difference in scope between the federal and state constitutional protections: "As the
plaintiff contends, the individual rights guaranteed by our state constitution's declaration of individual
rights (Article I) represent more specific protections of the individual against governmental power
than those found in the federal constitution's bill of rights, and they represent broader protection of
the individual." Bullock, supra, at 788.
18. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
19. Id. at 1385.
20. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
21. La. Const. art. I, § 5.
22. This author was surprised to discover that the bulk of the records of the debates during the
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suspicion would give him standing to raise in court a violation of his right to
privacy. The logical question becomes: what government action constitutes a
seizure?
A. What is a Seizure?
The two forms of government action that meet the criteria for a seizure are
arrests and investigatory stops. Louisiana statutory law defines an arrest as "the
taking of one person into the custody of another. To constitute arrest there must
be actual restraint of the person. The restraint may be imposed by force or may
result from the submission of the person arrested to the custody of the one
arresting him."" The law also requires the existence of probable cause prior
to the execution of an arrest.24 When the officer sprang from his car at Roby's
Arcade, his action did not constitute an arrest since Tucker's freedom of action
was not restrained to "a degree associated with a full custody arrest. 25
Theoretically, if the officer had found no evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause, Tucker would have been free to walk away from the scene.
In Terry v. Ohio,26 the United States Supreme Court, interpreting the Fourth
Amendment, held that some police encounters with citizens falling short of
arrests may still constitute seizures.21 To be lawful seizures, these investigatory
stops must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. ' 28
Although the Court in Terry made no specific pronouncement, such investigatory
Louisiana Constitutional Convention on Article 1. Section 5 dealt with the meaning of "any person
adversely affected." This enhanced standing provision was intended to ,ive greater effect to the
exclusionary rile. See 6 Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 1072-77 (1977).
23. La. Code Crim. P. art. 201.
24. La. Code Crim. P. art. 202 ("A warrant of arrest ... shall be issued when: ... (2) The
magistrate has probable cause to believe that an offense was committed and that the person against
whom the complaint was made committed it."), and La. Code Crim. P. art. 213 ("A peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when: ... (3) The peace officer has reasonable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed an offense ...."). State v. Thomas, 349 So.
2d 270, 272 (La. 1977). reinforced this point and provided a definition of probable cause: "Probable
cause exists when facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he
has reasonable and trustworthy information are sufficient to justify a man of average caution in the
belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing an offense."
25. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984) (citing California
v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983)). Justice Marshall's opinion dealt
with the issue of whether Miranda "custody" warnings are required for traffic stops. While Justice
Marshall gave no specific test for custody, his opinion that routine traffic stops do not constitute
custody focused on the duration of the detention, the public exposure of the encounter, and the
reasonable perception of the event by the detained person. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437, 438, 442, 104
S. Ct. at 3149, 3151.
26. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968).
27. Id. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
28. Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
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detention may be distinguished from arrests by the lower level of justification
(reasonable suspicion, as compared to probable cause), the limited duration, and
the limited scope of the encounter.
The Louisiana legislature has codified the holding of Terry.2 9 The courts
on both appellate levels found that, at the time of the initial encounter with
Tucker, the officer did not have the statutorily-required reasonable suspicion to
justify the seizure.' The lack of reasonable suspicion deprives the officer of
the authority to initiate the encounter; thus, the encounter impacted Tucker's
constitutional rights in a manner which required judicial protection. The next
step in the seizure analysis examines how this judicial protection is accom-
plished.
B. Protecting the Privacy Right
In addition to codifying the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
in Terry, Louisiana has also codified the exclusionary rule as a mechanism to
protect privacy rights.3" This protection is achieved by excluding from trial any
evidence the government obtains when violating a person's constitutional rights.
By using the rule to exclude illegally seized evidence, the courts seek to deter
the governmental actor from engaging in unconstitutional activity. The Louisiana
Supreme Court expressed this idea succinctly in State v. Ryan,3 2 while follow-
ing the reasoning of an earlier Louisiana case, State v. Saia:3   "At the
foundation of Saia is the proposition that police officers may not reap the
benefits of their unlawful intrusion into a citizen's freedom of movement."
The Louisiana Constitution protects a person's privacy interests in his
property as well as that person's privacy interests in his person.3 5 If property
is abandoned prior to an unlawful seizure of the person, such abandoned property
can be seized by the police and used against the person at trial.36 The courts
reason that there is no expectation of privacy attached to abandoned property;
therefore, no violation of constitutional rights occurs when the abandoned
property is taken by police. 7
29. "A law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense and may demand of him
his name, address, and an explanation of his actions." La. Code Crim. P. art. 215.1(A). See
generally John P. Murrill, Louisiana and the Justification fora Protective Frisk jbr Weapons, 54 La.
L. Rev. 1369 (1994).
30. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707. 709-10 (La.), aff'd on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
31. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703.
32. 358 So. 2d 1274 (La. 1978).
33. 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008, 95 S, Ct. 1454 (1975).
34. Ryan, 358 So. 2d at 1276.
35. La. Const. art. 1, § 5.
36. State v. Andrishok, 434 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1983).
37. State v. Chopin, 372 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (La. 1979).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court in Tucker accepts the findings of the court
of appeal that the officer, springing'from his car, lacked probable cause to arrest
Tucker or reasonable suspicion to stop him.38 In applying the exclusionary
rule/abandoned property formulation to the facts in Tucker, two crucial and
closely related questions, which will determine the admissibility of the seized
marijuana, form the next phase of the seizure analysis: (1) When did the seizure
occur? and (2) Did the defendant abandon the property before his person was
seized by the police?
I11. SEIZURE? WHAT SEIZURE?
A. The Pre-Tucker Test
The Louisiana Supreme Court answered the first question differently before
Tucker. As expressed in Justice Calogero's dissent in Tucker, the test was
understood to be: "[A] suspect is seized whenever there has been a display of
police authority which Would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is about
to be detained, whether or not lie has submitted to that display of authority."
39
The standard, which is based upon the perception of a reasonable person, is an
adoption of an earlier decision by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Mendenhall, ° in which the Supreme Court expressed the test for
seizure: "We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the
incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."4'
Another formulation of the test for seizure was given in State v. Saia.
Justice Dixon evaluated a police encounter with a person who had just left a
residence known to be a center for illegal drug distribution under the Fourth
Amendment. After deciding the seizure occurred when the "police officers
sprang from their car and overtook the defendant,"42 Justice Dixon declared:
"The police cannot approach citizens under circumstances that make it seem that
some form of detention is imminent .... ,,
These formulations of the test for seizure stress the importance of the
accosted citizen's perceptions of the governmental actor. In quoting State v.
38. State v. Tucker. 626 So. 2d 707. 713 (La.), aff'd on reh 'g. 626 So. 2d 720 (1993). See State
v. Tucker, 604 So. 2d 600, 609 (La. App. 2d Cir.), qlrd in part. rev'd in part, 626 So. 2d 707, aff'd
on reh'g, 626 So. 2d 720 (1993).
39. Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 714 (citing State v. Belton. 441 So. 2d 1195, 1198-99 (La. 1983).
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S. Ci. 2158 (1984)).
40. 446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980).
41. Id. at 554, 100 S. Ct. at 1877.
42. State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869, 873 (La. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1008, 95 S. Ct. 1454
(1975).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
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Sins" in his dissent in Tucker, Justice Dennis argues the pre-Tucker test
contemplated protecting even more than a person's freedom of movement. The
"more" that is protected is the Louisiana constitutional right to privacy: "the




B. The Tucker test
Justice Kimball, writing for the majority in Tucker, develops the new test by
beginning with the same source as the dissenters: State v. Belton.46 The key
language the majority draws from Belton is: "[I]t is only when the citizen is
actually stopped without reasonable cause or when a stop without reasonable
cause is imminent that the 'right to be left alone' is violated, thereby rendering
unlawful any resultant seizure of abandoned property."47 An examination of the
definitions of "actual stop" and "imminent actual stop" is the next step in the
seizure analysis.
The majority looks to the United States Supreme Court decision in
California v. Hodari D. to determine criteria for an actual stop. 8 In Hodari D.,
Justice Scalia applied the common-law understanding of an arrest in finding that
a fleeing suspect's Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated by the
police. 49 The common law contemplates the defining moment for an arrest to
be physical contact between the person and the police, or submission by the
person to a show of police authority."0 As a result of the court's adoption of
Hodari D., an actual stop under the Louisiana Constitution is now defined as
physical contact or submission to a show of police authority.5"
44. 426 So. 2d 148 (La. 1983). The relevant passage states: "A person is 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and La. Const. art. I, § 5 only when the law enforcement official,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the
citizen." Id. at 152 (emphasis added). The text of1 the Louisiana Constitution provides a reasonable
basis for this broad interpretation of liberty.
45. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707, 720 (La.) (Dennis, J., dissenting), affd on reh'g, 626 So.
2d 720 (1993) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478. 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). This right is usually described in Louisiana jurisprndence as "the right
to be lefi alone." This is more likely a unique interpretation, in keeping with the spirit of the state's
distinct constitution, than it is a misquotation.
46. 441 So. 2d 1195 (La. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S. Ct. 2158 (1984).
47. Tucker. 626 So. 2d at 710-11 (citing Belto,, 441 So. 2d at 1199).
48. For a helpful discussion of the effect of California i. Hodari D. on Fourth Amendment
seizure analysis, see Randolph A. Piedrahita, A Consevative Court Says "Goodbye to All That" and
Forges a New Order in the Law of Seizure-California v. Hodari D., 52 La. L. Rev. 1321 (1992).
49. California v. Hodari D.. 499 U.S. 621, 628. 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1552 (1991). As was the ease
in Tucker, the police in Hodari D. did not have even reasonable suspicion of the commission of a
crime when they approached the defendant. The encounters were also similar in that they involved
citizens who did not submit to any show of police authority, officers who did not physically restrain
the citizens until after the disputed evidence had been abandoned, and charges of drug possession.
Cf. Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 709, with Hodori D., 499 U.S. at 622-23, III S. Ct. at 1549.
50. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626, III S. Ct. at 1551.
51. Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 712.
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Justice Scalia's opinion replaced the Mendenhall standard for Fourth
Amendment purposes by reducing the Mendenhall criteria to "a necessary, but
not sufficient condition for seizure. 5 2 By adopting the Hodari D. standard and
overruling prior conflicting decisions, 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court has
likewise downgraded the Mendenhall standard.
The use of federal interpretations of the federal constitution by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in deciding state constitutional issues is well founded.' 4
However, to the extent the Louisiana Constitution provides more protection of
individual liberty than that afforded by the Fourth Amendment, such an adoptive
approach is inappropriate. The protection against unreasonable imminent actual
stops purports to reflect this additional safeguard of liberty.
55
In Tucker, the Louisiana Supreme Court redefines "imminent actual stop"
in terms of a virtual certainty that an actual stop will occur. Virtual certainty is
objectively determined by viewing the degree of police force used in the
encounter. If the police force employed were such that an actual stop would be
virtually certain to occur, regardless of a person's attempts to avoid the
encounter, then the person would be seized. The court then expounds a non-
exhaustive list of factors to be considered in the determination:
(1) the proximity of the police in relation to the defendant at the outset
of the encounter; (2) whether the individual has been surrounded by the
police; (3) whether the police approached the individual with their
weapons drawn; (4) whether the police and/or the individual are on foot
or in motorized vehicles during the encounter; (5) the location and
characteristics of the area where the encounter takes place; and (6) the
number of police officers involved in the encounter.56
When the Louisiana Supreme Court applies the new actual stop and
imminent actual stop factors to Tucker's encounter, it concludes the facts did not
show a seizure occurred prior to the abandonment of the drugs.5 7 There had
been no physical contact or submission to a show of police authority; therefore,
no actual stop occurred. The court notes that the encounter occurred at night, in
a commercial area, where several feet (and possibly a car) separated the officer
and Tucker. The court also notes that no testimony was available on whether
weapons were drawn and that the other officers in the area were probably
52. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28, 111 S. Ct. at 1551.
53. Tucker, 626 So. 2d at 713.
54. Id. at 714 (Marcus. J., concurring).
55. hi. at 712. Justice Kimball writes: "'We believe this two-pronged inquiry reflects the
aforementioned additional protections of our constitution. That is, while the Fourth Amendment only
protects individuals from 'actual stops,' . . . our constitution also protects individuals from 'imminent
actual stops."' Id.
56. Id. at 712-13.
57. Id. at 713.
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focused on other individuals. Thus, the majority found neither an actual stop
nor an imminent actual stop occurred when Tucker tossed away the drugs.
Because no seizure of the person occurred, there was no violation of
Tucker's Article I, section 5 rights when he abandoned the property. Therefore,
the drugs should not have been excluded as the product of an unlawful
seizure. 59 The court's finding that Tucker abandoned the property before any
seizure occurred answers the second question on the admissibility of the
marijuana The court's shift in emphasis from the perceptions of a reasonable
person to the virtual certainty of an actual stop occurring materially affects
Tucker's case.' This note will examine the further effects this shift will have
upon the seizure analysis.
C. Comparison of the Pre- and Post-Tucker tests
Justice Dennis argues fiercely in his dissent that, prior to Tucker, the
Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted Article I, section 5 to embody the
protection of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy found in the reasoning
of Katz v. United States.6 This expectation of privacy is discussed in that case
in the context of electronic eavesdropping by the state, but the expectation of
privacy warrants constitutional protection outside that narrow field. This idea is
summed up by the following:
In other words.... this court wholly endorsed the principle that under
Article I [Section] 5 of our state constitution a person suffers an
unconstitutional "search", "seizure" or "invasion of privacy" whenever
the state invades his reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of
whether his person or property physically has been seized or interfered
with.62
Standing alone, the objective factors in the Tucker test for imminent actual
stop do not adequately respect a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. The
prior Louisiana test (drawn from Mendenhall) examined the encounter with the
police from the perspective of a reasonable person expecting to be let alone.
63
If that person could not walk away from the encounter (actual stop), or
reasonably felt the police were attempting to prevent him from walking away
(imminent actual stop), then an Article 1, section 5 seizure had occurred.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. 'Thus, at the time Tucker abandoned the marijuana he had not been unconstitutionally
seized.... Accordingly, the decision of the coutn of appeal on count two is reversed. The trial
court's conviction of Tucker on this count is reinstated." Id.
61. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
62. State v. Tucker, 626 So. 2d 707. 717 (La.) (Dennis. J., dissenting), aff'd on reh'g, 626 So.
2d 720 (1993).




The use of the term "imminent" is ambiguous and causes the split between
the majority opinion and prior interpretations of the extent of state constitutional
protections. Using the majority's test, the focus of the court becomes the
probability the police will succeed in actually stopping a suspect. Under the
prior reasoning, the focus of the court fell on whether the police were attempting
to effect an unreasonable seizure.
Furthermore, the shifting of the judicial focus from attempt to likelihood of
success does not serve the crucial goal of deterring police from making the illicit
attempt in the first place. The question of the application of the exclusionary
rule is rendered moot in Tucker by the majority's finding that the police action
was insufficient to constitute a seizure under the Louisiana Constitution and,
thus, insufficient to trigger application of the rule. By narrowing the number of
encounters between the government and citizens that fall within the scope of the
exclusionary rule, this shift of judicial focus will also limit the effectiveness of
that rule.
1. The Narrowing Effect of Tucker
A hypothetical situation may clarify the distinction between the approaches
of focusing upon attempt and focusing on likelihood of success. Track Star is
walking down a city sidewalk at dusk. Lone Officer, lacking probable cause or
reasonable suspicion, pulls his patrol car in front of the path of Track Star just
before Track Star gets to the intersection crosswalk. Without drawing his
weapon, Lone Officer gets partially out of his unit, while calling to Track Star
in an authoritative voice, "Hold it right there. Yes, you. Don't move." Track
Star hesitates five yards from the car, which is parked between the officer and
Track Star, before giving a universal signal of defiance.
Under the Hodari D. analysis, no seizure of Track Star has occurred because
there has been no physical contact and no submission to the show of police
authority. Under the Tucker analysis, there would be no actual stop (same as the
analysis under Hodari D.), nor would there be an imminent actual stop.
Applying the non-exhaustive list of elements to the facts, a court could not say
that it would be virtually certain Lone Officer would catch Track Star or make
him submit to a similar show of police authority. However, applying the
hypothetical facts to a pre-Tucker test that focuses on whether Track Star could
reasonably perceive that Lone Officer was attempting to restrain his right to
privacy, a court would find that a seizure occurred.
2. The Reasonable Person Standard: Another Argument
The encounter between Track Star and Lone Officer would also require
constitutional protection if classified as an invasion of privacy. When the
controverted governmental action constitutes an invasion of privacy, State v.
1740 [Vol. 54
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Reeves64 could be cited for the proposition that the standard based upon the
perceptions of the reasonable man still applies in Louisiana. After Tucker, the
courts face the incongruity of applying different standards (virtual certainty for
seizures and perceptions of the reasonable person for invasions of privacy) for
alleged violations of the same constitutional right to privacy. While the facts in
Reeves65 are distinguishable from the hypothetical facts, the holding in Tucker
could likewise be limited by its exclusive focus on the meaning of a seizure.
Nevertheless, the result under the Louisiana Constitution should still be the same
whether the Track Star/Lone Officer encounter were classified as an invasion of
privacy or as a seizure: Track Star's Louisiana constitutional right to privacy
would have been violated. Violations of the right to privacy should be judged
by the single, consistent standard of the perceptions of a reasonable person.
The majority in Tucker, in formulating its test for seizure, observes the need
to balance the constitutional rights of the individual against the compelling
interest of the state in combatting the spread of drug-related criminal activity.
Though this necessary balancing purports to honor the greater protection the
Louisiana Constitution extends to its citizens, the announced test does not
achieve the desired result.' The reduced effectiveness of the exclusionary rule
is an unfortunate product of the balance.
D. A Remedy for the Narrowing Effect of Tucker
A simple, yet direct, solution would be to overrule Tucker by replacing the
virtual certainty aspect of the imminent actual stop test with the perception of the
reasonable person that a police officer is attempting to violate the right to
privacy. This solution would answer criticism that the new test is merely the
mirror of the current test used for Fourth Amendment violations.67 The solution
would also serve to solidify the adoption of the protection of a reasonable
expectation of privacy (expressed by the United States Supreme Court opinion
in Katz), as a matter of state constitutional law. Such an adoption would allow
64. 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1982).
65. Reeves involved coven electronic surveillance of the defendant by the government. A
conversation was recorded by equipment hidden, with the person's consent, on the body of a party
of the conversation. Id. at 404. The Louisiana Supreme Court initially rled that such eavesdropping
by the government required a warrant to avoid being an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. Id.
The court later reversed itself on rehearing, and determined that the defendant had exhibited no
reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting a consensual conversation; therefore, no invasion of
privacy occurred. Id. at 410.
66. As the hypothetical is intended to illustrate, an analysis under the Tucker test for seizure
would not extend constitutional protection to an encounter that would have previously (before the
decision in Tucker) enjoyed such protection.
67. "But the outcome of this case itself vividly illustrates that the majority's cumbersome system
.,quickly collapses into nothing more than the common law theory of arrest adopted in Hodari."




the courts to apply the same analysis to a government/citizen encounter
regardless of whether that encounter is classified as a seizure or as an invasion
of privacy.
The non-exhaustive list of factors used by the majority in Tucker is still
consistent with the suggested solution; it is merely inadequate to meet the
constitutional demands. Indeed, these factors should be retained as a tool to
assist a court in gauging the objective reasonableness of the suspect's perception
of an attempted interference with his privacy interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
This state's constitution is a reflection of the fundamental values of its
citizens. In some instances, the Louisiana Constitution mirrors its federal
counterpart in determining the method and extent of the interactions between the
state and its citizens. In other areas, such as protection of privacy interests, the
state constitution goes further in restricting governmental action and goes further
in expanding the categories of protected rights. However, because of the virtual
certainty element of the new test for a seizure announced in Tucker, the
Louisiana Constitution will not protect citizens against some encounters where
the police lack probable cause or reasonable suspicion. While providing a logical
interpretation of the meaning of the term "imminent," the virtual certainty aspect
of the Tucker test weakens the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in deterring
unlawful police action. A standard based upon the perceptions of a reasonable
person strengthens the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule; furthermore, the
reasonable person standard provides the courts with a uniform test which does
not depend upon classifying a state/citizen encounter as either an invasion of
privacy or as a seizure.
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